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  3. So CopyFail CVE-2026-31431 is a thing.

So CopyFail CVE-2026-31431 is a thing.

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  • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
    @joshbressers @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss Honestly, there was nothing "obvious" about this one being a "big one" compared to all of the bugs we get, and fix, on a daily/weekly basis in the kernel.

    The ONLY thing different here from those bugfixes, was that someone made a web site, a simple reproducer, and announced it to the world. For 99.9% of the bugs we fix, that are reproducible like this, no one ever does that. That we know of...

    In other words, this was just another Tuesday for us.
    joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
    joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
    joshbressers@infosec.exchange
    wrote last edited by
    #77

    @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

    I do wonder sometimes how many of those CVEs you file could be a privilege escalation with a proper reproducer

    I'm sure it's not zero

    gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 1 Reply Last reply
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    • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

      @Di4na @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

      Yes, the fact that the official advisory said Update your distribution's kernel package and Most major distributions are shipping the fix now when not a single distribution on the planet had an updated kernel package is evidence that the whole publication was a "Look at us!" vehicle, and everybody else on the planet be damned!

      I can't say that it's a lie because I can't prove that they knew it was wrong.

      Side wonder: Can something written by AI never be called a lie? 🤔

      Link Preview Image
      di4na@hachyderm.ioD This user is from outside of this forum
      di4na@hachyderm.ioD This user is from outside of this forum
      di4na@hachyderm.io
      wrote last edited by
      #78

      @wdormann @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss mostly yes, which is also why I refuse to call it hallucinations or other anthropomorphizing statements... because it just aggregates words together that sounds like they work together.

      1 Reply Last reply
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      • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

        @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

        I do wonder sometimes how many of those CVEs you file could be a privilege escalation with a proper reproducer

        I'm sure it's not zero

        gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
        gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
        gregkh@social.kernel.org
        wrote last edited by
        #79
        @joshbressers @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss Loads of them.
        1 Reply Last reply
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        • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

          @wdormann @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

          Do I think this would have helped? I'm willing to say it probably wouldn't have hurt. But if the players would have asked for a long embargo, that could have been bad

          Not telling the kernel security team is super lame, that should be the minimum bar

          gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
          gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
          gregkh@social.kernel.org
          wrote last edited by
          #80
          @joshbressers @wdormann @deftpunk @Viss What do you mean, they told us, we fixed it, it got in some stable kernels, and so our work on the security team was done. The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while, and even gave it a CVSS score.

          The fact that no distro popped up that used older kernel versions to do the real work to backport to older kernels seems to be everyone's major problem here. That is outside of the kernel security team's work entirely. So take it up with the distros that people are paying support for to do this for them?

          And yes, Debian was vulnerable, that is not good, and once it was noticed people worked hard and quickly to fix that. Not bad for a community-based distro that no one pays for in my opinion.
          joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP corsac@mastodon.socialC 3 Replies Last reply
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          • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

            @gunstick
            The original (and current) CVE entry is merely the commit message.

            Which is unintelligible nonsense for anyone other than a Linux kernel developer.

            gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.luG This user is from outside of this forum
            gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.luG This user is from outside of this forum
            gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.lu
            wrote last edited by
            #81

            @wdormann exactly.
            If it would say CVSS 7.3 more eyes would have looked (distro maintainers).
            If it says "exploit to root available" even more eyes would heve looked.
            Instead it is just technobabble to align the dilithium crystals, so nobody knows what it means.

            1 Reply Last reply
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            • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
              @joshbressers @wdormann @deftpunk @Viss What do you mean, they told us, we fixed it, it got in some stable kernels, and so our work on the security team was done. The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while, and even gave it a CVSS score.

              The fact that no distro popped up that used older kernel versions to do the real work to backport to older kernels seems to be everyone's major problem here. That is outside of the kernel security team's work entirely. So take it up with the distros that people are paying support for to do this for them?

              And yes, Debian was vulnerable, that is not good, and once it was noticed people worked hard and quickly to fix that. Not bad for a community-based distro that no one pays for in my opinion.
              joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
              joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
              joshbressers@infosec.exchange
              wrote last edited by
              #82

              @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

              You said this wasn't reported to the kernel security team

              From where I sit (and I'm not in the middle of this) it seems like if you plan to make a website and give something a name, tell the securiy team

              If you're OK with the current process though I shall trust you on this, you're the expert, I'm just the peanut gallery

              gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 1 Reply Last reply
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              • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

                @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

                You said this wasn't reported to the kernel security team

                From where I sit (and I'm not in the middle of this) it seems like if you plan to make a website and give something a name, tell the securiy team

                If you're OK with the current process though I shall trust you on this, you're the expert, I'm just the peanut gallery

                gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                gregkh@social.kernel.org
                wrote last edited by
                #83
                @joshbressers @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss the "announcement of a public web site and exploit" was not sent to the kernel security team. If you look at the timeline they published, they show what they sent the kernel security team and when, which seems to be correct to me.
                joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ 1 Reply Last reply
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                • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

                  @alcastronic
                  "Good" is a weird way to describe something that only works on some distributions.

                  alcastronic@infosec.exchangeA This user is from outside of this forum
                  alcastronic@infosec.exchangeA This user is from outside of this forum
                  alcastronic@infosec.exchange
                  wrote last edited by
                  #84

                  @wdormann
                  With "good", I was referring to RHEL's proposal that requires a reboot to become effective.

                  1 Reply Last reply
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                  • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                    @joshbressers @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss the "announcement of a public web site and exploit" was not sent to the kernel security team. If you look at the timeline they published, they show what they sent the kernel security team and when, which seems to be correct to me.
                    joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                    joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                    joshbressers@infosec.exchange
                    wrote last edited by
                    #85

                    @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

                    I do think signaling intent to publish a website and make noise falls under a proper disclosure plan

                    1 Reply Last reply
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                    • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                      @joshbressers @wdormann @deftpunk @Viss What do you mean, they told us, we fixed it, it got in some stable kernels, and so our work on the security team was done. The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while, and even gave it a CVSS score.

                      The fact that no distro popped up that used older kernel versions to do the real work to backport to older kernels seems to be everyone's major problem here. That is outside of the kernel security team's work entirely. So take it up with the distros that people are paying support for to do this for them?

                      And yes, Debian was vulnerable, that is not good, and once it was noticed people worked hard and quickly to fix that. Not bad for a community-based distro that no one pays for in my opinion.
                      penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
                      penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
                      penguin42@mastodon.org.uk
                      wrote last edited by
                      #86

                      @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss How did 'The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while' work? I see the docs say it's the reporters job to tell the CVE team; but hmm that CVE assignment was ~3 weeks after the fix went in mainline - is there something that could help there? e.g. did linux-security give the CVE guys a nudge, or remind the original reporters they needed to do that?

                      gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 1 Reply Last reply
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                      • penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP penguin42@mastodon.org.uk

                        @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss How did 'The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while' work? I see the docs say it's the reporters job to tell the CVE team; but hmm that CVE assignment was ~3 weeks after the fix went in mainline - is there something that could help there? e.g. did linux-security give the CVE guys a nudge, or remind the original reporters they needed to do that?

                        gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                        gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                        gregkh@social.kernel.org
                        wrote last edited by
                        #87
                        @penguin42 @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss I honestly don't remember, and if I did, we don't publish who asked for CVE ids from us as that's generally not a good idea to do so (and is not a requirement for being a CNA).
                        penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP 1 Reply Last reply
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                        • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                          @penguin42 @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss I honestly don't remember, and if I did, we don't publish who asked for CVE ids from us as that's generally not a good idea to do so (and is not a requirement for being a CNA).
                          penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
                          penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
                          penguin42@mastodon.org.uk
                          wrote last edited by
                          #88

                          @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss Hmm OK - tbh I think that gap to the CVE being issued is the biggest thing here (says he on the outside), if that was issued earlier I think there would have been a better chance a distro might have noticed. So perhaps if linux-security makes sure it reminds reporters to do it, and also asks them to give you a heads up before any announcement that might have helped here.

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                          • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                            @joshbressers @wdormann @deftpunk @Viss What do you mean, they told us, we fixed it, it got in some stable kernels, and so our work on the security team was done. The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while, and even gave it a CVSS score.

                            The fact that no distro popped up that used older kernel versions to do the real work to backport to older kernels seems to be everyone's major problem here. That is outside of the kernel security team's work entirely. So take it up with the distros that people are paying support for to do this for them?

                            And yes, Debian was vulnerable, that is not good, and once it was noticed people worked hard and quickly to fix that. Not bad for a community-based distro that no one pays for in my opinion.
                            corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                            corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                            corsac@mastodon.social
                            wrote last edited by
                            #89

                            @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss I think we (the distro security teams, speaking as a member of the Debian one) would have liked a heads up, including maybe to help backporting to the stable kernel we run. We didn't have that heads up, we discovered the thing like everyone else.

                            corsac@mastodon.socialC 1 Reply Last reply
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                            • corsac@mastodon.socialC corsac@mastodon.social

                              @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss I think we (the distro security teams, speaking as a member of the Debian one) would have liked a heads up, including maybe to help backporting to the stable kernel we run. We didn't have that heads up, we discovered the thing like everyone else.

                              corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                              corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                              corsac@mastodon.social
                              wrote last edited by
                              #90

                              @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss

                              As Greg mentioned, vulnerability coordination is difficult, and it's hard to draw a line about who to include and who not to.

                              Maybe the researchers thought they did the right thing by notifying the kernel security team (and they did), and they thought it was enough. But I don't think it's written anywhere that the kernel security team will coordinate with downstream (or anyone else), and again I'm not sure it's really possible.

                              corsac@mastodon.socialC 1 Reply Last reply
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                              • corsac@mastodon.socialC corsac@mastodon.social

                                @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss

                                As Greg mentioned, vulnerability coordination is difficult, and it's hard to draw a line about who to include and who not to.

                                Maybe the researchers thought they did the right thing by notifying the kernel security team (and they did), and they thought it was enough. But I don't think it's written anywhere that the kernel security team will coordinate with downstream (or anyone else), and again I'm not sure it's really possible.

                                corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
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                                corsac@mastodon.social
                                wrote last edited by
                                #91

                                @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss
                                Still, it leaves a bit of a bitter taste. Not sure how we can do better though.

                                aissen@social.treehouse.systemsA 1 Reply Last reply
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                                • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                                  @wdormann @joshbressers @Viss I love it how people think that "coordination of vulnerabilities" is actually something that can be done these days. Think of just who uses the software in question, and who should, and should not, be on such a list to get a "early disclosure notification".

                                  As I have said for quite some time now, all early-disclosure lists are leaks, otherwise why would your government allow them to be in existence?

                                  Software, and specifically open source software, runs the world. So should the whole world be on that notification list? 🙂
                                  zmanion@infosec.exchangeZ This user is from outside of this forum
                                  zmanion@infosec.exchangeZ This user is from outside of this forum
                                  zmanion@infosec.exchange
                                  wrote last edited by
                                  #92

                                  @gregkh @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss so there's absolutely no middle ground? When there is clearly a bug with security impact, give the distros list a week notice (two weeks max, per their policy). If it leaks, outcome is no worse than not notifying distros. The researcher can even do it instead of the kernel. At scale (Linux!) this seems like a Pareto distribution: major distros cover disproportionally most users.

                                  gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 1 Reply Last reply
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                                  • corsac@mastodon.socialC corsac@mastodon.social

                                    @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss
                                    Still, it leaves a bit of a bitter taste. Not sure how we can do better though.

                                    aissen@social.treehouse.systemsA This user is from outside of this forum
                                    aissen@social.treehouse.systemsA This user is from outside of this forum
                                    aissen@social.treehouse.systems
                                    wrote last edited by
                                    #93

                                    @corsac
                                    > Not sure how we can do better though

                                    A random idea, not sure how far it is from what you already do:
                                    Bump automation where packages from latest stable branches are built and available with no human intervention in specific repositories. Manual promotion for generic repos should be as effortless as possible.

                                    corsac@mastodon.socialC 1 Reply Last reply
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                                    • aissen@social.treehouse.systemsA aissen@social.treehouse.systems

                                      @corsac
                                      > Not sure how we can do better though

                                      A random idea, not sure how far it is from what you already do:
                                      Bump automation where packages from latest stable branches are built and available with no human intervention in specific repositories. Manual promotion for generic repos should be as effortless as possible.

                                      corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                                      corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                                      corsac@mastodon.social
                                      wrote last edited by
                                      #94

                                      @Aissen The process is already pretty scripted but there's still some manual things to do (whether in the kernel packaging or in the DSA processing).

                                      On Apr 30th v6.12.85 was tagged at 1116Z and the DSA was sent at 2005Z. I'm unsure we can do much faster.

                                      note: I didn't do anything this time, it's mainly the work of Salvatore Bonaccorso (as a volunteer): https://salsa.debian.org/kernel-team/linux/-/merge_requests/1895

                                      1 Reply Last reply
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                                      • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

                                        @letoams @CliffsEsport
                                        Up-to-date Fedora (42 or later) are not affected at the time of publication (Yesterday).
                                        At least on this Fedora 42 system, the kernel was built on April 23 and in stable 2 days ago. Not a few hours ago.

                                        letoams@defcon.socialL This user is from outside of this forum
                                        letoams@defcon.socialL This user is from outside of this forum
                                        letoams@defcon.social
                                        wrote last edited by
                                        #95

                                        @wdormann weird because I had a successful test on up to date f42 yesterday …

                                        wdormann@infosec.exchangeW 1 Reply Last reply
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                                        • letoams@defcon.socialL letoams@defcon.social

                                          @wdormann weird because I had a successful test on up to date f42 yesterday …

                                          wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
                                          wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
                                          wdormann@infosec.exchange
                                          wrote last edited by
                                          #96

                                          @letoams
                                          Got a snapshot that you can revert to?
                                          I'd like to see the evidence (along with showing the current kernel version).

                                          letoams@defcon.socialL 1 Reply Last reply
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