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  3. So CopyFail CVE-2026-31431 is a thing.

So CopyFail CVE-2026-31431 is a thing.

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  • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

    @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

    It's going to be a wild couple of years

    I do think you're right that the traditional disclosure model is gone forever

    But this one feels different. It was pretty obvious this was going to be a big one. Most CVEs are extremely lame and will never lead to anything

    But some are a big deal. And those can get drown in the great CVE garbage patch

    I have no idea what to do about those though, especially in open source

    gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
    gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
    gregkh@social.kernel.org
    wrote last edited by
    #74
    @joshbressers @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss Honestly, there was nothing "obvious" about this one being a "big one" compared to all of the bugs we get, and fix, on a daily/weekly basis in the kernel.

    The ONLY thing different here from those bugfixes, was that someone made a web site, a simple reproducer, and announced it to the world. For 99.9% of the bugs we fix, that are reproducible like this, no one ever does that. That we know of...

    In other words, this was just another Tuesday for us.
    joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ 1 Reply Last reply
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    • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

      @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

      I get it that a lot of the world uses Linux.

      But what if...
      In an alternate universe, before publication of the flashy copy.fail writeup with public exploit code, the vulnerability was (for example) reported to the linux-distros mailing list, where the major linux distros are present. And they could hear why this particular vulnerability might want to be on their radar more than the rest of the sea of Linux kernel CVEs? (Universality, reliability, to-be-published exploit code, etc.)

      Would this alternate universe be:

      gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
      gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
      gregkh@social.kernel.org
      wrote last edited by
      #75
      @wdormann @joshbressers @deftpunk @Viss Not ALL of the distros are on linux-distros. So that is one thing. The other being that I don't care what happens on linux-distros, for many public reasons I refuse to deal with them anymore, and strongly encourage no one else to do so either.
      1 Reply Last reply
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      • di4na@hachyderm.ioD di4na@hachyderm.io

        @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss Here is my take. Just publishing it and letting people catch up, without the "disclosure" is ok.

        What is not ok is spreading misinformation and trying to make yourself look bigger than it is, yelling "patch now" when no patch exists, etc

        Yeah we need to patch. We know. That is a job for our tooling to tell us. Not the people getting social and possibly marketing clout out of it.

        wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
        wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
        wdormann@infosec.exchange
        wrote last edited by
        #76

        @Di4na @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

        Yes, the fact that the official advisory said Update your distribution's kernel package and Most major distributions are shipping the fix now when not a single distribution on the planet had an updated kernel package is evidence that the whole publication was a "Look at us!" vehicle, and everybody else on the planet be damned!

        I can't say that it's a lie because I can't prove that they knew it was wrong.

        Side wonder: Can something written by AI never be called a lie? 🤔

        Link Preview Image
        di4na@hachyderm.ioD 1 Reply Last reply
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        • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
          @joshbressers @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss Honestly, there was nothing "obvious" about this one being a "big one" compared to all of the bugs we get, and fix, on a daily/weekly basis in the kernel.

          The ONLY thing different here from those bugfixes, was that someone made a web site, a simple reproducer, and announced it to the world. For 99.9% of the bugs we fix, that are reproducible like this, no one ever does that. That we know of...

          In other words, this was just another Tuesday for us.
          joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
          joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
          joshbressers@infosec.exchange
          wrote last edited by
          #77

          @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

          I do wonder sometimes how many of those CVEs you file could be a privilege escalation with a proper reproducer

          I'm sure it's not zero

          gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 1 Reply Last reply
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          • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

            @Di4na @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

            Yes, the fact that the official advisory said Update your distribution's kernel package and Most major distributions are shipping the fix now when not a single distribution on the planet had an updated kernel package is evidence that the whole publication was a "Look at us!" vehicle, and everybody else on the planet be damned!

            I can't say that it's a lie because I can't prove that they knew it was wrong.

            Side wonder: Can something written by AI never be called a lie? 🤔

            Link Preview Image
            di4na@hachyderm.ioD This user is from outside of this forum
            di4na@hachyderm.ioD This user is from outside of this forum
            di4na@hachyderm.io
            wrote last edited by
            #78

            @wdormann @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss mostly yes, which is also why I refuse to call it hallucinations or other anthropomorphizing statements... because it just aggregates words together that sounds like they work together.

            1 Reply Last reply
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            • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

              @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

              I do wonder sometimes how many of those CVEs you file could be a privilege escalation with a proper reproducer

              I'm sure it's not zero

              gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
              gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
              gregkh@social.kernel.org
              wrote last edited by
              #79
              @joshbressers @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss Loads of them.
              1 Reply Last reply
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              • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

                @wdormann @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

                Do I think this would have helped? I'm willing to say it probably wouldn't have hurt. But if the players would have asked for a long embargo, that could have been bad

                Not telling the kernel security team is super lame, that should be the minimum bar

                gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                gregkh@social.kernel.org
                wrote last edited by
                #80
                @joshbressers @wdormann @deftpunk @Viss What do you mean, they told us, we fixed it, it got in some stable kernels, and so our work on the security team was done. The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while, and even gave it a CVSS score.

                The fact that no distro popped up that used older kernel versions to do the real work to backport to older kernels seems to be everyone's major problem here. That is outside of the kernel security team's work entirely. So take it up with the distros that people are paying support for to do this for them?

                And yes, Debian was vulnerable, that is not good, and once it was noticed people worked hard and quickly to fix that. Not bad for a community-based distro that no one pays for in my opinion.
                joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP corsac@mastodon.socialC 3 Replies Last reply
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                • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

                  @gunstick
                  The original (and current) CVE entry is merely the commit message.

                  Which is unintelligible nonsense for anyone other than a Linux kernel developer.

                  gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.luG This user is from outside of this forum
                  gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.luG This user is from outside of this forum
                  gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.lu
                  wrote last edited by
                  #81

                  @wdormann exactly.
                  If it would say CVSS 7.3 more eyes would have looked (distro maintainers).
                  If it says "exploit to root available" even more eyes would heve looked.
                  Instead it is just technobabble to align the dilithium crystals, so nobody knows what it means.

                  1 Reply Last reply
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                  • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                    @joshbressers @wdormann @deftpunk @Viss What do you mean, they told us, we fixed it, it got in some stable kernels, and so our work on the security team was done. The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while, and even gave it a CVSS score.

                    The fact that no distro popped up that used older kernel versions to do the real work to backport to older kernels seems to be everyone's major problem here. That is outside of the kernel security team's work entirely. So take it up with the distros that people are paying support for to do this for them?

                    And yes, Debian was vulnerable, that is not good, and once it was noticed people worked hard and quickly to fix that. Not bad for a community-based distro that no one pays for in my opinion.
                    joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                    joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                    joshbressers@infosec.exchange
                    wrote last edited by
                    #82

                    @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

                    You said this wasn't reported to the kernel security team

                    From where I sit (and I'm not in the middle of this) it seems like if you plan to make a website and give something a name, tell the securiy team

                    If you're OK with the current process though I shall trust you on this, you're the expert, I'm just the peanut gallery

                    gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 1 Reply Last reply
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                    • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

                      @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

                      You said this wasn't reported to the kernel security team

                      From where I sit (and I'm not in the middle of this) it seems like if you plan to make a website and give something a name, tell the securiy team

                      If you're OK with the current process though I shall trust you on this, you're the expert, I'm just the peanut gallery

                      gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                      gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                      gregkh@social.kernel.org
                      wrote last edited by
                      #83
                      @joshbressers @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss the "announcement of a public web site and exploit" was not sent to the kernel security team. If you look at the timeline they published, they show what they sent the kernel security team and when, which seems to be correct to me.
                      joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ 1 Reply Last reply
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                      • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

                        @alcastronic
                        "Good" is a weird way to describe something that only works on some distributions.

                        alcastronic@infosec.exchangeA This user is from outside of this forum
                        alcastronic@infosec.exchangeA This user is from outside of this forum
                        alcastronic@infosec.exchange
                        wrote last edited by
                        #84

                        @wdormann
                        With "good", I was referring to RHEL's proposal that requires a reboot to become effective.

                        1 Reply Last reply
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                        • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                          @joshbressers @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss the "announcement of a public web site and exploit" was not sent to the kernel security team. If you look at the timeline they published, they show what they sent the kernel security team and when, which seems to be correct to me.
                          joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                          joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                          joshbressers@infosec.exchange
                          wrote last edited by
                          #85

                          @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

                          I do think signaling intent to publish a website and make noise falls under a proper disclosure plan

                          1 Reply Last reply
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                          • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                            @joshbressers @wdormann @deftpunk @Viss What do you mean, they told us, we fixed it, it got in some stable kernels, and so our work on the security team was done. The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while, and even gave it a CVSS score.

                            The fact that no distro popped up that used older kernel versions to do the real work to backport to older kernels seems to be everyone's major problem here. That is outside of the kernel security team's work entirely. So take it up with the distros that people are paying support for to do this for them?

                            And yes, Debian was vulnerable, that is not good, and once it was noticed people worked hard and quickly to fix that. Not bad for a community-based distro that no one pays for in my opinion.
                            penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
                            penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
                            penguin42@mastodon.org.uk
                            wrote last edited by
                            #86

                            @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss How did 'The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while' work? I see the docs say it's the reporters job to tell the CVE team; but hmm that CVE assignment was ~3 weeks after the fix went in mainline - is there something that could help there? e.g. did linux-security give the CVE guys a nudge, or remind the original reporters they needed to do that?

                            gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 1 Reply Last reply
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                            • penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP penguin42@mastodon.org.uk

                              @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss How did 'The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while' work? I see the docs say it's the reporters job to tell the CVE team; but hmm that CVE assignment was ~3 weeks after the fix went in mainline - is there something that could help there? e.g. did linux-security give the CVE guys a nudge, or remind the original reporters they needed to do that?

                              gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                              gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                              gregkh@social.kernel.org
                              wrote last edited by
                              #87
                              @penguin42 @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss I honestly don't remember, and if I did, we don't publish who asked for CVE ids from us as that's generally not a good idea to do so (and is not a requirement for being a CNA).
                              penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP 1 Reply Last reply
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                              • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                                @penguin42 @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss I honestly don't remember, and if I did, we don't publish who asked for CVE ids from us as that's generally not a good idea to do so (and is not a requirement for being a CNA).
                                penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
                                penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
                                penguin42@mastodon.org.uk
                                wrote last edited by
                                #88

                                @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss Hmm OK - tbh I think that gap to the CVE being issued is the biggest thing here (says he on the outside), if that was issued earlier I think there would have been a better chance a distro might have noticed. So perhaps if linux-security makes sure it reminds reporters to do it, and also asks them to give you a heads up before any announcement that might have helped here.

                                1 Reply Last reply
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                                • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                                  @joshbressers @wdormann @deftpunk @Viss What do you mean, they told us, we fixed it, it got in some stable kernels, and so our work on the security team was done. The CVE team assigned a CVE after a while, and even gave it a CVSS score.

                                  The fact that no distro popped up that used older kernel versions to do the real work to backport to older kernels seems to be everyone's major problem here. That is outside of the kernel security team's work entirely. So take it up with the distros that people are paying support for to do this for them?

                                  And yes, Debian was vulnerable, that is not good, and once it was noticed people worked hard and quickly to fix that. Not bad for a community-based distro that no one pays for in my opinion.
                                  corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                                  corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                                  corsac@mastodon.social
                                  wrote last edited by
                                  #89

                                  @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss I think we (the distro security teams, speaking as a member of the Debian one) would have liked a heads up, including maybe to help backporting to the stable kernel we run. We didn't have that heads up, we discovered the thing like everyone else.

                                  corsac@mastodon.socialC 1 Reply Last reply
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                                  • corsac@mastodon.socialC corsac@mastodon.social

                                    @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss I think we (the distro security teams, speaking as a member of the Debian one) would have liked a heads up, including maybe to help backporting to the stable kernel we run. We didn't have that heads up, we discovered the thing like everyone else.

                                    corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                                    corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                                    corsac@mastodon.social
                                    wrote last edited by
                                    #90

                                    @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss

                                    As Greg mentioned, vulnerability coordination is difficult, and it's hard to draw a line about who to include and who not to.

                                    Maybe the researchers thought they did the right thing by notifying the kernel security team (and they did), and they thought it was enough. But I don't think it's written anywhere that the kernel security team will coordinate with downstream (or anyone else), and again I'm not sure it's really possible.

                                    corsac@mastodon.socialC 1 Reply Last reply
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                                    • corsac@mastodon.socialC corsac@mastodon.social

                                      @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss

                                      As Greg mentioned, vulnerability coordination is difficult, and it's hard to draw a line about who to include and who not to.

                                      Maybe the researchers thought they did the right thing by notifying the kernel security team (and they did), and they thought it was enough. But I don't think it's written anywhere that the kernel security team will coordinate with downstream (or anyone else), and again I'm not sure it's really possible.

                                      corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                                      corsac@mastodon.socialC This user is from outside of this forum
                                      corsac@mastodon.social
                                      wrote last edited by
                                      #91

                                      @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss
                                      Still, it leaves a bit of a bitter taste. Not sure how we can do better though.

                                      aissen@social.treehouse.systemsA 1 Reply Last reply
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                                      • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                                        @wdormann @joshbressers @Viss I love it how people think that "coordination of vulnerabilities" is actually something that can be done these days. Think of just who uses the software in question, and who should, and should not, be on such a list to get a "early disclosure notification".

                                        As I have said for quite some time now, all early-disclosure lists are leaks, otherwise why would your government allow them to be in existence?

                                        Software, and specifically open source software, runs the world. So should the whole world be on that notification list? 🙂
                                        zmanion@infosec.exchangeZ This user is from outside of this forum
                                        zmanion@infosec.exchangeZ This user is from outside of this forum
                                        zmanion@infosec.exchange
                                        wrote last edited by
                                        #92

                                        @gregkh @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss so there's absolutely no middle ground? When there is clearly a bug with security impact, give the distros list a week notice (two weeks max, per their policy). If it leaks, outcome is no worse than not notifying distros. The researcher can even do it instead of the kernel. At scale (Linux!) this seems like a Pareto distribution: major distros cover disproportionally most users.

                                        gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 1 Reply Last reply
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                                        • corsac@mastodon.socialC corsac@mastodon.social

                                          @gregkh @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss
                                          Still, it leaves a bit of a bitter taste. Not sure how we can do better though.

                                          aissen@social.treehouse.systemsA This user is from outside of this forum
                                          aissen@social.treehouse.systemsA This user is from outside of this forum
                                          aissen@social.treehouse.systems
                                          wrote last edited by
                                          #93

                                          @corsac
                                          > Not sure how we can do better though

                                          A random idea, not sure how far it is from what you already do:
                                          Bump automation where packages from latest stable branches are built and available with no human intervention in specific repositories. Manual promotion for generic repos should be as effortless as possible.

                                          corsac@mastodon.socialC 1 Reply Last reply
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