So CopyFail CVE-2026-31431 is a thing.
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@joshbressers @gregkh @wdormann @Viss @andrewnez @Di4na it would be cool if vulnerability databases could synchronize with each other using activitypub or similar
@ariadne @joshbressers @gregkh @wdormann @Viss @andrewnez @Di4na The Vulnerability Lookup folks are working on something close
GCVE-BCP-03 - Decentralized Publication Standard
Decentralized Publication Standard Version: 1.5 Status: Published (for public review) Date: 2026-03-10 Authors: GCVE Working Group BCP ID: BCP-03 This guide is distributed under CC-BY-4.0. Copyright (C) 2025-2026 GCVE Initiative. Introduction This document describes the decentralized publication model that allows GNAs to publish their vulnerability information directly, without relying on a centralized system. It also outlines the access methods GNAs use to distribute published vulnerabilities through various mechanisms.
(gcve.eu)
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@Di4na @gregkh @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss that’s call risk management and it’s not necessarily a bad thing. And people have been (and still are) burned by updates. I don’t think it’s a good reason to never update but I can’t blame people for being cautious, especially since I’m not in their shoes and don’t know all their concerns
@corsac @gregkh @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss I mean, yes, this is kinda my point above
But also, they are also burned (and not less) by not updating. It is just not considered the same way in the stats and not seen as the same thing. Because not updating is always in the past *after* the incident -
This post got into my head. I think you're right, the days of coordination are over
So I wrote it down
https://opensourcesecurity.io/2026/05-vulnerability-economics/@joshbressers The one case where downstream vendors can still get advance notice? When they're actually directly employing people on the project level security response teams (which is a potentially double edged sword from the project's side, since it means volunteers don't have to do security response without compensation for their time, but risks bringing those dubious corporate incentives you mentioned up to the project level)
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@corsac @gregkh @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss I mean, yes, this is kinda my point above
But also, they are also burned (and not less) by not updating. It is just not considered the same way in the stats and not seen as the same thing. Because not updating is always in the past *after* the incident @Di4na @gregkh @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss unfortunately I think there a lot of people (IT services) having been burned more badly by updating than not updating. I still think people should do it (especially because mass vulnerability exploitation seems to usually happen for stuff fixes months ago) but still just blaming them for not doing doesn’t work. Not sure it’s really the Linux kernel the concern here though.
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@Di4na @gregkh @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss unfortunately I think there a lot of people (IT services) having been burned more badly by updating than not updating. I still think people should do it (especially because mass vulnerability exploitation seems to usually happen for stuff fixes months ago) but still just blaming them for not doing doesn’t work. Not sure it’s really the Linux kernel the concern here though.
@corsac @gregkh @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss I think it is not true, but it is because we do not burn people for not updating
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This post got into my head. I think you're right, the days of coordination are over
So I wrote it down
https://opensourcesecurity.io/2026/05-vulnerability-economics/@joshbressers @gregkh @wdormann @Viss this may be true for the Linux kernel, especially with the resignation that the Linux CNA will assign a CVE for most reports, but it doesn't align with my anecdotal experience as glibc CNA. It's likely because we have significantly less volume (12 so far this year, with roughly twice as many reports) and we tend to be picky about what we assign to a CVE id to.
I'd argue that the kernel is special here and doesn't represent the ecosystem.
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@gregkh @joshbressers @wdormann @corsac @Viss
Here is a small thing to think about.
The whole point of cve is to allow you to not update.
That may sound strange but think about it. The whole point is that as long as we do not reveive a massive panic alert from this limited source, then we do not have to update.
This is why it has become so central. Orgs are fundamentally wired against updates.
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@ariadne @joshbressers @gregkh @wdormann @Viss @andrewnez @Di4na If only we had some sort of... "Open Source" Vulnerability Database.. as a clearing house. Some sort of non-profit org could maintain it probably
someone should get on that
-waits for attacks from angry squirrels-
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@ariadne @joshbressers @gregkh @wdormann @Viss @andrewnez @Di4na The Vulnerability Lookup folks are working on something close
GCVE-BCP-03 - Decentralized Publication Standard
Decentralized Publication Standard Version: 1.5 Status: Published (for public review) Date: 2026-03-10 Authors: GCVE Working Group BCP ID: BCP-03 This guide is distributed under CC-BY-4.0. Copyright (C) 2025-2026 GCVE Initiative. Introduction This document describes the decentralized publication model that allows GNAs to publish their vulnerability information directly, without relying on a centralized system. It also outlines the access methods GNAs use to distribute published vulnerabilities through various mechanisms.
(gcve.eu)
@Le_suisse @ariadne @gregkh @wdormann @Viss @andrewnez @Di4na
Yes! The #GCVE folks are really on the ball about all this
I would be willing to bet a milkshake they will be one of the more authoritative sources in the future
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@joshbressers The one case where downstream vendors can still get advance notice? When they're actually directly employing people on the project level security response teams (which is a potentially double edged sword from the project's side, since it means volunteers don't have to do security response without compensation for their time, but risks bringing those dubious corporate incentives you mentioned up to the project level)
I'm not opposed to a company employing people at a given project to get some advanced notice
The devil is in the details, but I think in many cases it could work
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@joshbressers @ariadne @gregkh @wdormann @Viss @andrewnez @Di4na (that’s the joke)
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@joshbressers @gregkh @wdormann @Viss this may be true for the Linux kernel, especially with the resignation that the Linux CNA will assign a CVE for most reports, but it doesn't align with my anecdotal experience as glibc CNA. It's likely because we have significantly less volume (12 so far this year, with roughly twice as many reports) and we tend to be picky about what we assign to a CVE id to.
I'd argue that the kernel is special here and doesn't represent the ecosystem.
@siddhesh_p @gregkh @wdormann @Viss
Every project is really its own ecosystem
I think glibc does a really good job with CVEs
But I suspect if you go from 12 a year to 12 a month your process will have to change
It's possible you would adopt the "give it a CVE and move on" approach, or because there is so much attention from the distros you could get some extra help to deal with the volume
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@joshbressers @ariadne @gregkh @wdormann @Viss @andrewnez @Di4na (that’s the joke)
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I'm not opposed to a company employing people at a given project to get some advanced notice
The devil is in the details, but I think in many cases it could work
@joshbressers Yeah, I think it's generally a good thing myself (the responsiveness that's desirable for a good SRT isn't reasonable to expect from volunteers, and involving vendor/redistributor employees is one way of addressing that gap). It "just" needs to be done with awareness of the potentially conflicting interests.
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@gregkh @icing @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss "it is not easy to decide who should be on the list, so we can not even have list with Linux distros hat should obviously be on list" argument seems rather unconvincing though.
To reiterate what he said, they do have a list its everyone, when they publish the CVE.
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This post got into my head. I think you're right, the days of coordination are over
So I wrote it down
https://opensourcesecurity.io/2026/05-vulnerability-economics/sounds like software distributors now get to experience what most users used to experience: all of a sudden a problem that someone else knew about but we didn't needs to be figured out and dealt with urgently. disclosure procedures made the situation more comfortable for the distributors, but not so much for the users, who got the whole story at once and had to react promptly, instead of as a developing story. maybe this new development levels the playing field a little, making things really inconvenient for everyone. that sort of moral justice is not much of a consolation, alas
CC: @gregkh@social.kernel.org @wdormann@infosec.exchange @Viss@mastodon.social
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@joshbressers Yeah, I think it's generally a good thing myself (the responsiveness that's desirable for a good SRT isn't reasonable to expect from volunteers, and involving vendor/redistributor employees is one way of addressing that gap). It "just" needs to be done with awareness of the potentially conflicting interests.
@ancoghlan @joshbressers I think it would be a good outcome if the new EU laws encouraged companies basing their products on FOSS to set up their own trade orgs to handle maintenance and security response rather than trying to to fob that off on the original volunteers who donated the code but aren't getting paid. There needs to be a way to funnel money back to the people doing work, and making big claims about developer responsibility deflects from the commercial orgs who base products on FOSS
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@ariadne @joshbressers @gregkh @wdormann @Viss @andrewnez @Di4na If only we had some sort of... "Open Source" Vulnerability Database.. as a clearing house. Some sort of non-profit org could maintain it probably
someone should get on that
-waits for attacks from angry squirrels-
@ra6bit @ariadne @joshbressers @gregkh @wdormann @Viss @andrewnez @Di4na And then we could have spectacular arguments about what to assign those vulnerabilities where finders argue for maxing out everything even when the vuln is unreachable in practice. (*screaming from the curl maintainers in the distance*)
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@siddhesh_p @gregkh @wdormann @Viss
Every project is really its own ecosystem
I think glibc does a really good job with CVEs
But I suspect if you go from 12 a year to 12 a month your process will have to change
It's possible you would adopt the "give it a CVE and move on" approach, or because there is so much attention from the distros you could get some extra help to deal with the volume
@joshbressers @gregkh @wdormann @Viss I'm not so sure, I just think there's a vast enough distance between the Linux kernel experience and pretty much any other project when it comes to security handling: volume, nature of reports, density of known exploitable issues. etc. that there aren't really any reasonable parallels to be drawn. I wouldn't think of throwing security policies, CVE evaluation or coordinated disclosure out because the kernel can't find a way to do it in a way that they like.
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@joshbressers @gregkh @wdormann @Viss I'm not so sure, I just think there's a vast enough distance between the Linux kernel experience and pretty much any other project when it comes to security handling: volume, nature of reports, density of known exploitable issues. etc. that there aren't really any reasonable parallels to be drawn. I wouldn't think of throwing security policies, CVE evaluation or coordinated disclosure out because the kernel can't find a way to do it in a way that they like.
@joshbressers @gregkh @wdormann @Viss and $0.02, security policies are pretty much our first line of defence for security issues for the GNU toolchain, where we try to identify clearly what constitutes a security issues. It also makes it clear to users how to use the tools and API securely. I don't think there's a reasonable equivalent for that for the kernel. One could try, but given that it's a privileged program that's involved in everything, it would be a largely pointless effort.
