CIRCLE WITH A DOT

Update — the "coming soon" SelfDataGuard mentioned at the bottom of this thread is now released as v0.1.0-beta.

Per-user envelope encryption that survives DB exfiltration. Same memorized secret unlocks both modules, mathematically isolated via HMAC contexts.

Live demo: https://dataguard.my-self.fr
Release: https://github.com/Pierroons/my-self/releases/tag/selfdataguard-v0.1.0-beta

#SelfDataGuard #InfoSec #Cryptography

SelfDataGuard v0.1.0-beta — open-source data-at-rest protection that survives DB exfiltration.

Released today as the second pillar of MySelf, paired with SelfRecover. The same May 2026 ANTS leak (~12M accounts in plaintext) made the case for both: SelfRecover protects authentication, SelfDataGuard
protects what's stored.

How it works (one line):
Per-user data master key, never stored in plain. Wrapped twice — once by Argon2id-derived key from password, once by HMAC-SHA256-derived key from a memorized secret (shared with SelfRecover via mathematical
context separation). Personal fields encrypted field-by-field with AES-256-GCM. Dump the DB → encrypted soup.

Three operational modes:

▸ Lite (default): server unwraps the master key in memory only during user sessions.

▸ Hybrid (e-commerce): operational fields admin-readable, sensitive fields zero-knowledge.

▸ Full (high-assurance): true zero-knowledge, all crypto in browser via WebCrypto.

Honest threat model — explicitly out of scope: compromised user endpoint (keyloggers, info-stealers), browser exploits, theoretical cryptanalysis of SHA-256 / AES-256-GCM / Argon2id, weak-password
bruteforce. The lib enforces password policy at deployment time.

Run the demo locally in 10 seconds:
git clone https://github.com/Pierroons/my-self
cd my-self/self-security/selfdataguard/demo && ./run.sh
(needs PHP 8.1+ with sodium + AES-NI capable CPU)

🧪 155 sanity tests, 0 failures. Includes a "DB dump = encrypted soup" end-to-end assertion that greps the SQLite file post-write to verify no plaintext leaks.

GPG-signed tag selfdataguard-v0.1.0-beta, release dated 2026-05-08.

Live demo (no signup, ephemeral data, public reset every night at 04:00 Europe/Paris):
https://dataguard.my-self.fr

Whitepaper EN: https://github.com/Pierroons/my-self/blob/main/self-security/selfdataguard/docs/whitepaper-en.md
Whitepaper FR: https://github.com/Pierroons/my-self/blob/main/self-security/selfdataguard/docs/whitepaper-fr.md
Repo: https://github.com/Pierroons/my-self/tree/main/self-security/selfdataguard
Release: https://github.com/Pierroons/my-self/releases/tag/selfdataguard-v0.1.0-beta

Companion to SelfRecover (https://bi-self.my-self.fr/selfrecover/). Same memorized secret unlocks both, mathematically isolated via HMAC contexts (/recover vs /dataguard). One word, two purposes.

Feedback especially welcome from people who have integrated Bitwarden / 1Password / ProtonMail-style envelope encryption in app-side multi-tenant setups. AGPL-3.0-or-later, no NDA, no commercial agenda —
community cryptographic review before v1.0.0.

#opensource #infosec #AGPL #privacy #selfhosted #cryptography #encryption #zerotrust #dataprotection

SelfRecover — open source protocol for password recovery without email

I designed and released SelfRecover under AGPL-3.0-or-later in April 2026, two weeks before the French ID agency (ANTS) breach exposed ~12M citizen accounts via an IDOR. The case for email-less recovery
suddenly got very tangible.

How it works (one line):
The browser computes HMAC-SHA256(secret, current_domain). The server only stores Argon2id hashes of derived values. The raw secret never leaves the user's browser, and a captured secret on site A is useless on
site B (anti-phishing by construction).

Two adoption modes:

▸ Full: zero email at all. Diceware passphrase (EFF wordlist 7,776 words) + HMAC-per-domain.

▸ Lite: keeps existing SMTP reset link, but adds a user-memorized word HMAC-derived client-side. So an intercepted reset email is no longer enough to compromise an account. Compatible with legacy stacks.

Honest threat model — explicitly out of scope: client compromise (keyloggers, info-stealers), browser exploits, physical coercion, theoretical cryptanalysis of SHA-256 / Argon2id. The protocol assumes a
trusted endpoint. For higher-assurance contexts, Tails / Qubes is the right answer.

Self-host in 30 seconds:
docker run -p 8080:8080 ghcr.io/pierroons/selfrecover:v0.1.1
(Image multi-arch amd64 + arm64, AGPL labels embedded)

GPG-signed tag v0.1.1, release dated 2026-05-05.

Live demos (no signup, ephemeral data):
- Full mode: https://bi-self.my-self.fr/selfrecover/
- Lite mode: https://bi-self.my-self.fr/selfrecover/lite.html
- Side-by-side comparison (8 adversary classes × 3 models): https://bi-self.my-self.fr/selfrecover/comparison.html

Whitepaper EN: https://github.com/Pierroons/my-self/blob/main/bi-self/selfrecover/docs/whitepaper-en.md
Whitepaper FR: https://github.com/Pierroons/my-self/blob/main/bi-self/selfrecover/docs/whitepaper-fr.md
Repo: https://github.com/Pierroons/my-self/tree/main/bi-self/selfrecover

The protocol is the first brick of a broader self-hosted ecosystem (MySelf — https://my-self.fr) that includes SelfModerate (community governance), SelfJustice / SelfAct (legal access), SelfFarm-Lite
(agricultural management), and SelfDataGuard (data-at-rest protection — coming soon).

Feedback especially welcome from people who have integrated similar split-knowledge schemes, and from anyone running auth flows in self-hosted setups. AGPL-3.0-or-later, no NDA, no commercial agenda — just an
open protocol that I hope is useful.

#opensource #infosec #AGPL #privacy #selfhosted #cryptography #authentication #zerotrust