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  3. So CopyFail CVE-2026-31431 is a thing.

So CopyFail CVE-2026-31431 is a thing.

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  • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

    What went wrong with this case?

    Theori appear to have only contacted the linux kernel devs with the vulnerability, as opposed to going the usual CVD route that includes all of the major Linux distros.

    Why is this a problem? Since the linux kernel became a CNA, there has been a flood of CVEs for the Linux kernel. The Linux kernel devs' arguments is that any given kernel flaw could presumably be leveraged to behave as a vulnerability, and it's not worth their time to determine "vulnerability" or "not a vulnerability". Everything gets a CVE.

    Now the case with copy.fail? It was indeed reported to the kernel devs. And it got a CVE. A single CVE buried in flood of all of the Linux kernel CVEs.

    And it appears that every distro on the planet was blindsided by this proven-exploitable vulnerability because they were not given any warning. Or even any suggestion to pick this single CVE out of the sea of Linux kernel CVEs as worth cherry picking.

    Much to the chagrin of the Linux devs, RHEL doesn't use up-to-date Linux kernels. They cherry pick CVEs to backport to their chosen kernel version. (e.g. the latest and greates RHEL 10.1 uses 6.12.0, which was released November 17 2024). And in this world where bad actors like Theori don't involve vendors in vulnerability coordination, and just about every Linux kernel bug gets a CVE, this workflow fails. Hard.

    Good times...

    brotundspiele@chaos.socialB This user is from outside of this forum
    brotundspiele@chaos.socialB This user is from outside of this forum
    brotundspiele@chaos.social
    wrote last edited by
    #56

    @wdormann And that's why you don't cherry pick bugfixes. If the Linux kernel team says they can't tell for sure if a bug might be a security issue, how do Redhat, Debian, Canonical etc. have the hubris to think they are better at that?

    My distros kernel was fixed on 11.4.2026, just hours after the kernel team released their fix. I use Arch by the way.

    1 Reply Last reply
    0
    • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
      @wdormann @joshbressers @Viss I love it how people think that "coordination of vulnerabilities" is actually something that can be done these days. Think of just who uses the software in question, and who should, and should not, be on such a list to get a "early disclosure notification".

      As I have said for quite some time now, all early-disclosure lists are leaks, otherwise why would your government allow them to be in existence?

      Software, and specifically open source software, runs the world. So should the whole world be on that notification list? 🙂
      deftpunk@fosstodon.orgD This user is from outside of this forum
      deftpunk@fosstodon.orgD This user is from outside of this forum
      deftpunk@fosstodon.org
      wrote last edited by
      #57

      @gregkh @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss So just to clarify: In your view, would it have been equally fine to announce without contacting the Linux security team?

      gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 1 Reply Last reply
      0
      • deftpunk@fosstodon.orgD deftpunk@fosstodon.org

        @gregkh @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss So just to clarify: In your view, would it have been equally fine to announce without contacting the Linux security team?

        gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
        gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
        gregkh@social.kernel.org
        wrote last edited by
        #58
        @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss no one did contact the kernel security team before they announced this. It was nice enough that they sent us a bug report and we got it fixed and pushed out to the latest stable kernel releases. That's all I can ever hope for.
        joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ 1 Reply Last reply
        0
        • mjdxp@labyrinth.zoneM mjdxp@labyrinth.zone
          @wdormann sorry this is off topic, but this is the first time i've ever seen anyone using the stock xfce layout
          moses_izumi@fe.disroot.orgM This user is from outside of this forum
          moses_izumi@fe.disroot.orgM This user is from outside of this forum
          moses_izumi@fe.disroot.org
          wrote last edited by
          #59
          @mjdxp @wdormann
          Yeah I always get rid of the dock.
          On my latest run I also disabled the start menu, because I prefer the Application Finder program.
          1 Reply Last reply
          0
          • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

            What went wrong with this case?

            Theori appear to have only contacted the linux kernel devs with the vulnerability, as opposed to going the usual CVD route that includes all of the major Linux distros.

            Why is this a problem? Since the linux kernel became a CNA, there has been a flood of CVEs for the Linux kernel. The Linux kernel devs' arguments is that any given kernel flaw could presumably be leveraged to behave as a vulnerability, and it's not worth their time to determine "vulnerability" or "not a vulnerability". Everything gets a CVE.

            Now the case with copy.fail? It was indeed reported to the kernel devs. And it got a CVE. A single CVE buried in flood of all of the Linux kernel CVEs.

            And it appears that every distro on the planet was blindsided by this proven-exploitable vulnerability because they were not given any warning. Or even any suggestion to pick this single CVE out of the sea of Linux kernel CVEs as worth cherry picking.

            Much to the chagrin of the Linux devs, RHEL doesn't use up-to-date Linux kernels. They cherry pick CVEs to backport to their chosen kernel version. (e.g. the latest and greates RHEL 10.1 uses 6.12.0, which was released November 17 2024). And in this world where bad actors like Theori don't involve vendors in vulnerability coordination, and just about every Linux kernel bug gets a CVE, this workflow fails. Hard.

            Good times...

            gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.luG This user is from outside of this forum
            gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.luG This user is from outside of this forum
            gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.lu
            wrote last edited by
            #60

            @wdormann did the initial CVE have a CVSS score and LPE written all over it?
            The kernel patch I saw only says "revert to previous way of doing things"

            wdormann@infosec.exchangeW 1 Reply Last reply
            0
            • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

              Unlike what the buffoons at Theori published as a "mitigation", the folks at Red Hat actually published a viable mitigation for CopyFail CVE-2026-31431.

              Specifically, edit your grub (or whatever you use to load your kernel) configuration to have one of the following arguments:
              initcall_blacklist=algif_aead_init
              initcall_blacklist=af_alg_init
              initcall_blacklist=crypto_authenc_esn_module_init

              With such boot arguments to the Linux kernel, the affected bits won't be reachable.

              alcastronic@infosec.exchangeA This user is from outside of this forum
              alcastronic@infosec.exchangeA This user is from outside of this forum
              alcastronic@infosec.exchange
              wrote last edited by
              #61

              @wdormann The mitigation to block the modules on boot is good. There is one drawback tough - it requires a reboot. Something that may not be immediately feasible in every environment. On RHEL, this is, however, needed, as algif_aead is part of the kernel.

              wdormann@infosec.exchangeW 1 Reply Last reply
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              • alcastronic@infosec.exchangeA alcastronic@infosec.exchange

                @wdormann The mitigation to block the modules on boot is good. There is one drawback tough - it requires a reboot. Something that may not be immediately feasible in every environment. On RHEL, this is, however, needed, as algif_aead is part of the kernel.

                wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
                wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
                wdormann@infosec.exchange
                wrote last edited by
                #62

                @alcastronic
                "Good" is a weird way to describe something that only works on some distributions.

                alcastronic@infosec.exchangeA 1 Reply Last reply
                0
                • gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.luG gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.lu

                  @wdormann did the initial CVE have a CVSS score and LPE written all over it?
                  The kernel patch I saw only says "revert to previous way of doing things"

                  wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
                  wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
                  wdormann@infosec.exchange
                  wrote last edited by
                  #63

                  @gunstick
                  The original (and current) CVE entry is merely the commit message.

                  Which is unintelligible nonsense for anyone other than a Linux kernel developer.

                  Link Preview Image
                  gunstick@mastodon.opencloud.luG 1 Reply Last reply
                  0
                  • gregkh@social.kernel.orgG gregkh@social.kernel.org
                    @deftpunk @joshbressers @wdormann @Viss no one did contact the kernel security team before they announced this. It was nice enough that they sent us a bug report and we got it fixed and pushed out to the latest stable kernel releases. That's all I can ever hope for.
                    joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                    joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                    joshbressers@infosec.exchange
                    wrote last edited by
                    #64

                    @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

                    It's going to be a wild couple of years

                    I do think you're right that the traditional disclosure model is gone forever

                    But this one feels different. It was pretty obvious this was going to be a big one. Most CVEs are extremely lame and will never lead to anything

                    But some are a big deal. And those can get drown in the great CVE garbage patch

                    I have no idea what to do about those though, especially in open source

                    wdormann@infosec.exchangeW di4na@hachyderm.ioD gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 3 Replies Last reply
                    0
                    • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

                      @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

                      It's going to be a wild couple of years

                      I do think you're right that the traditional disclosure model is gone forever

                      But this one feels different. It was pretty obvious this was going to be a big one. Most CVEs are extremely lame and will never lead to anything

                      But some are a big deal. And those can get drown in the great CVE garbage patch

                      I have no idea what to do about those though, especially in open source

                      wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
                      wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
                      wdormann@infosec.exchange
                      wrote last edited by
                      #65

                      @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

                      I get it that a lot of the world uses Linux.

                      But what if...
                      In an alternate universe, before publication of the flashy copy.fail writeup with public exploit code, the vulnerability was (for example) reported to the linux-distros mailing list, where the major linux distros are present. And they could hear why this particular vulnerability might want to be on their radar more than the rest of the sea of Linux kernel CVEs? (Universality, reliability, to-be-published exploit code, etc.)

                      Would this alternate universe be:

                      joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 2 Replies Last reply
                      0
                      • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

                        @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

                        I get it that a lot of the world uses Linux.

                        But what if...
                        In an alternate universe, before publication of the flashy copy.fail writeup with public exploit code, the vulnerability was (for example) reported to the linux-distros mailing list, where the major linux distros are present. And they could hear why this particular vulnerability might want to be on their radar more than the rest of the sea of Linux kernel CVEs? (Universality, reliability, to-be-published exploit code, etc.)

                        Would this alternate universe be:

                        joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                        joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                        joshbressers@infosec.exchange
                        wrote last edited by
                        #66

                        @wdormann @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

                        Do I think this would have helped? I'm willing to say it probably wouldn't have hurt. But if the players would have asked for a long embargo, that could have been bad

                        Not telling the kernel security team is super lame, that should be the minimum bar

                        wdormann@infosec.exchangeW gregkh@social.kernel.orgG 2 Replies Last reply
                        0
                        • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

                          @wdormann @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

                          Do I think this would have helped? I'm willing to say it probably wouldn't have hurt. But if the players would have asked for a long embargo, that could have been bad

                          Not telling the kernel security team is super lame, that should be the minimum bar

                          wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
                          wdormann@infosec.exchangeW This user is from outside of this forum
                          wdormann@infosec.exchange
                          wrote last edited by
                          #67

                          @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

                          The maximum embargo for said list is 14 days.

                          Link Preview Image
                          joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ 1 Reply Last reply
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                          • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

                            @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

                            The maximum embargo for said list is 14 days.

                            Link Preview Image
                            joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                            joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                            joshbressers@infosec.exchange
                            wrote last edited by
                            #68

                            @wdormann @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

                            I'm too far removed to know all the process now

                            4 days is pretty good, yeah

                            joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ 1 Reply Last reply
                            0
                            • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

                              @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

                              It's going to be a wild couple of years

                              I do think you're right that the traditional disclosure model is gone forever

                              But this one feels different. It was pretty obvious this was going to be a big one. Most CVEs are extremely lame and will never lead to anything

                              But some are a big deal. And those can get drown in the great CVE garbage patch

                              I have no idea what to do about those though, especially in open source

                              di4na@hachyderm.ioD This user is from outside of this forum
                              di4na@hachyderm.ioD This user is from outside of this forum
                              di4na@hachyderm.io
                              wrote last edited by
                              #69

                              @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss Here is my take. Just publishing it and letting people catch up, without the "disclosure" is ok.

                              What is not ok is spreading misinformation and trying to make yourself look bigger than it is, yelling "patch now" when no patch exists, etc

                              Yeah we need to patch. We know. That is a job for our tooling to tell us. Not the people getting social and possibly marketing clout out of it.

                              joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ wdormann@infosec.exchangeW 2 Replies Last reply
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                              • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

                                @wdormann @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

                                I'm too far removed to know all the process now

                                4 days is pretty good, yeah

                                joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                                joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                                joshbressers@infosec.exchange
                                wrote last edited by
                                #70

                                @wdormann @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

                                Ugh, I misread your 14 as a 4 it seems

                                14 is still pretty good for most things, I won't argue about that

                                1 Reply Last reply
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                                • di4na@hachyderm.ioD di4na@hachyderm.io

                                  @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss Here is my take. Just publishing it and letting people catch up, without the "disclosure" is ok.

                                  What is not ok is spreading misinformation and trying to make yourself look bigger than it is, yelling "patch now" when no patch exists, etc

                                  Yeah we need to patch. We know. That is a job for our tooling to tell us. Not the people getting social and possibly marketing clout out of it.

                                  joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                                  joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ This user is from outside of this forum
                                  joshbressers@infosec.exchange
                                  wrote last edited by
                                  #71

                                  @Di4na @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

                                  That's also a good point

                                  It's extra frustrating when there's nothing us unwashed masses can do except wait

                                  di4na@hachyderm.ioD 1 Reply Last reply
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                                  • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

                                    @Di4na @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

                                    That's also a good point

                                    It's extra frustrating when there's nothing us unwashed masses can do except wait

                                    di4na@hachyderm.ioD This user is from outside of this forum
                                    di4na@hachyderm.ioD This user is from outside of this forum
                                    di4na@hachyderm.io
                                    wrote last edited by
                                    #72

                                    @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss I am ok with waiting. That's the job. I am not ok with having to deal with all my management chain coming to me with no context one after the other asking me if we need to panic because they saw it in linkedin.

                                    Or asking me which AI tool we need to buy to find and patch these automatically before they get found, because it is what the marketing in these tell us.

                                    andrewnez@mastodon.socialA 1 Reply Last reply
                                    0
                                    • di4na@hachyderm.ioD di4na@hachyderm.io

                                      @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss I am ok with waiting. That's the job. I am not ok with having to deal with all my management chain coming to me with no context one after the other asking me if we need to panic because they saw it in linkedin.

                                      Or asking me which AI tool we need to buy to find and patch these automatically before they get found, because it is what the marketing in these tell us.

                                      andrewnez@mastodon.socialA This user is from outside of this forum
                                      andrewnez@mastodon.socialA This user is from outside of this forum
                                      andrewnez@mastodon.social
                                      wrote last edited by
                                      #73

                                      @Di4na @joshbressers you need to buy them all!

                                      1 Reply Last reply
                                      0
                                      • joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ joshbressers@infosec.exchange

                                        @gregkh @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss

                                        It's going to be a wild couple of years

                                        I do think you're right that the traditional disclosure model is gone forever

                                        But this one feels different. It was pretty obvious this was going to be a big one. Most CVEs are extremely lame and will never lead to anything

                                        But some are a big deal. And those can get drown in the great CVE garbage patch

                                        I have no idea what to do about those though, especially in open source

                                        gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                                        gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                                        gregkh@social.kernel.org
                                        wrote last edited by
                                        #74
                                        @joshbressers @deftpunk @wdormann @Viss Honestly, there was nothing "obvious" about this one being a "big one" compared to all of the bugs we get, and fix, on a daily/weekly basis in the kernel.

                                        The ONLY thing different here from those bugfixes, was that someone made a web site, a simple reproducer, and announced it to the world. For 99.9% of the bugs we fix, that are reproducible like this, no one ever does that. That we know of...

                                        In other words, this was just another Tuesday for us.
                                        joshbressers@infosec.exchangeJ 1 Reply Last reply
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                                        • wdormann@infosec.exchangeW wdormann@infosec.exchange

                                          @joshbressers @gregkh @deftpunk @Viss

                                          I get it that a lot of the world uses Linux.

                                          But what if...
                                          In an alternate universe, before publication of the flashy copy.fail writeup with public exploit code, the vulnerability was (for example) reported to the linux-distros mailing list, where the major linux distros are present. And they could hear why this particular vulnerability might want to be on their radar more than the rest of the sea of Linux kernel CVEs? (Universality, reliability, to-be-published exploit code, etc.)

                                          Would this alternate universe be:

                                          gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                                          gregkh@social.kernel.orgG This user is from outside of this forum
                                          gregkh@social.kernel.org
                                          wrote last edited by
                                          #75
                                          @wdormann @joshbressers @deftpunk @Viss Not ALL of the distros are on linux-distros. So that is one thing. The other being that I don't care what happens on linux-distros, for many public reasons I refuse to deal with them anymore, and strongly encourage no one else to do so either.
                                          1 Reply Last reply
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