Why are there so many articles about PLCs on the Internet where they specifically say they're vulnerable to attacks from Iran?

[da_667@infosec.exchange]

@cR0w @nerdpr0f even more important than that for power generation and distribution, it was the wildlife and the climate that was a bigger threat than any of those things.

[rootwyrm@weird.autos]

@da_667 @cR0w @nerdpr0f hey now, sometimes the vendors of the equipment attached to the PLC are the ones who bring in the infected shit.

[nerdpr0f@infosec.exchange]

@rootwyrm @da_667 @cR0w Don't forget bad third party dependencies.

[mttaggart@infosec.exchange]

@da_667 @cR0w @nerdpr0f I mean I think the point was that this is a pattern observed in the past by specifically these actors, and that in this moment, it's worth reconsideration.

Now granted, CISA does not cite their sources, but the claim was this exploitation was happening anew. And if it was similar to the CyberAv3ngers situation, they wouldn't be shy about claiming credit.

[da_667@infosec.exchange]

@rootwyrm @cR0w @nerdpr0f that's exactly what I was saying. I was a part of an IR engagement where a gas generation plant had to go into manual mode because the vendor infected their server 2003 cluster and fucked operations there for weeks.

[cr0w@infosec.exchange]

@da_667 @nerdpr0f RIP cybersquirrel1

[ryanb@infosec.exchange]

@rootwyrm @da_667 @cR0w @nerdpr0f Seen it.

[cr0w@infosec.exchange]

@mttaggart @da_667 @nerdpr0f CISA appears to no longer be any more than three DOGE kids in a trenchcoat with a pile of cocaine. I don't expect citations from them anymore as I don't hardly trust them anymore. We can discuss some of that elsewhere when I get my brain in that mode, but there has been so much advice from CISA that appears to just be "Grok, search for Iran and rehash something to make it sound current and relevant."

[viss@mastodon.social]

@da_667 @rootwyrm @cR0w @nerdpr0f

oh like target!
some hvac vendor came in and thats how they got all their registers infected.

yeah every time theres "big news"(tm) with nation state attackers everyone goes OH NO THEY CAN GO AFTER HYDRO AND POWER AND BANKS AND HOSPITALS

of course thats where they would go

all those verticals intentionally avoid security at nearly all cost all the time.

they're the lowest hanging fruit

[da_667@infosec.exchange]

@cR0w @mttaggart @nerdpr0f

CISAs haunted

"what"

grabs cyber shotgun

CISAs haunted.

[viss@mastodon.social]

@da_667 @rootwyrm @cR0w @nerdpr0f when i worked at sempra energy, one of the things i got to do was "vendor security reviews". that means doing assessments on shit rando business units wanted to buy or setup.

they would OPEN THE DISCUSSION with the phrase:

"tell me when youre done with your assessment, so we can file the risk acceptance forms".

meaning they had zero interest in the report, because they were gonna bypass it no matter what was in it

[cr0w@infosec.exchange]

@da_667 @mttaggart @nerdpr0f

[none@infosec.exchange]

@Viss @da_667 @rootwyrm @cR0w @nerdpr0f mandatory plug of https://youtu.be/9IG3zqvUqJY

[multisn8@mastodon.catgirl.cloud]

@nerdpr0f @cR0w Figuring the same, causality could be the other way around. Iran takes up a lot of collective {mind,news}space right now, leaving writers to think "oh Damn what could They possibly Do to Our Sacred Infrastructure". The leap isn't far to grab the next best thing, it just turns out a general vulnerability is prone to abuse from Iranian hackers as well

[multisn8@mastodon.catgirl.cloud]

@nerdpr0f @cR0w "their heinious foreign hacking" vs "our glorious protective FISA"

[gsuberland@chaos.social]

@da_667 @cR0w @nerdpr0f weather, wildlife, and human error. the movie scenarios of mass cyber attacks are nonsense. most of the "cyber" happening with ICS/SCADA environments comes down to regular ransomware shit and phishing. even in the marine sector the biggest threat was pirate groups sending fake emails claiming to be the coastguard or a port authority telling the captain to redirect into unprotected waters, so they could steal the vessel's fuel. it ain't sophisticated at all.

[cr0w@infosec.exchange]

@gsuberland @da_667 @nerdpr0f I'm with you but you have to add the shitty firewall vulns in there in recent years too with ransomware and phishing.

[gsuberland@chaos.social]

@cR0w @da_667 @nerdpr0f yeah point being it's overwhelmingly just regular IT stuff where the attackers aren't interested in the OT environments at all. and when they do want something novel, like on the ships, it's never sophisticated. just the most basic technique possible to get the result.

[cr0w@infosec.exchange]

@gsuberland @da_667 @nerdpr0f Ah, I gotcha. Yeah, people tend to think it's either an accident an actor made their way into OT space ( often is ) or they're targeting it and using whatever new mythical version of is discussed in the forums or Telegram channels or whatever.

[gsuberland@chaos.social]

@cR0w @da_667 @nerdpr0f hell even when it's state actors they just pick the simple stuff. IGRC needed to make it hard to navigate when they ("allegedly") stuck a limpet mine to the side of that fuel tanker near the Strait of Hormuz a few years ago. did they use an RCE to get into the ship's OT network, then pivot to the ECDIS to lock out navigation assistance? of course not, they just used a cheap radio jammer to make them lose GPS lock.