Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena.
-
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir
> si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne.
-
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything
@murena Vous êtes sérieux ? Sous entendre que les systèmes sécurisés sont utiles pour que les pédophiles échappent à la justice ?
Vous étiez déjà dans le fond du panier en ce qui concerne la compétence technique, mais là c'est absolument lamentable. -
> si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne.
GrapheneOS exists to protect users from having their privacy invaded by arbitrary individuals, corporations and states. Privacy depends on security. GrapheneOS heavily improves both privacy and security while providing a high level of usability and near perfect app compatibility.
-
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything
@GrapheneOS yeah, Jeffrey Epstein using gmail to run modern days' most successful honeytrap espionage operation is the best and only counterargument needed when someone states that IT backdoors protect children.
-
GrapheneOS exists to protect users from having their privacy invaded by arbitrary individuals, corporations and states. Privacy depends on security. GrapheneOS heavily improves both privacy and security while providing a high level of usability and near perfect app compatibility.
/e/ has far worse privacy and security than the Android Open Source Project. They fail to keep up with important standard privacy and security patches for Android, Linux, firmware, drivers and HALs. They fail to provide current generation Android privacy and security protections.
-
/e/ has far worse privacy and security than the Android Open Source Project. They fail to keep up with important standard privacy and security patches for Android, Linux, firmware, drivers and HALs. They fail to provide current generation Android privacy and security protections.
For years, Gaël Duval has spearheaded a campaign to misrepresent GrapheneOS as not being usable, not compatible with apps and only useful to a tiny minority of people. He has repeatedly claimed GrapheneOS is for pedophiles, criminals and spies while claiming /e/ is for everyone.
-
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything
@GrapheneOS when we don't have masks we say they are useless against covid. When we don't have solid security we say it's for spies and pedos.
I understand that their focus is not on hardening but on building alternatives to google services, but that doesn't mean they need to talk like this about android hardening.
-
For years, Gaël Duval has spearheaded a campaign to misrepresent GrapheneOS as not being usable, not compatible with apps and only useful to a tiny minority of people. He has repeatedly claimed GrapheneOS is for pedophiles, criminals and spies while claiming /e/ is for everyone.
-
For years, Gaël Duval has spearheaded a campaign to misrepresent GrapheneOS as not being usable, not compatible with apps and only useful to a tiny minority of people. He has repeatedly claimed GrapheneOS is for pedophiles, criminals and spies while claiming /e/ is for everyone.
@GrapheneOS woo interesting I didn't know those declaration from Gael
about you as project -
GrapheneOS exists to protect users from having their privacy invaded by arbitrary individuals, corporations and states. Privacy depends on security. GrapheneOS heavily improves both privacy and security while providing a high level of usability and near perfect app compatibility.
@GrapheneOS and I, as an activist couldn't be anymore grateful for you!
-
For years, Gaël Duval has spearheaded a campaign to misrepresent GrapheneOS as not being usable, not compatible with apps and only useful to a tiny minority of people. He has repeatedly claimed GrapheneOS is for pedophiles, criminals and spies while claiming /e/ is for everyone.
It's hardly only GrapheneOS focusing on protecting users against exploits. Apple and Google have put a ton of work into it. Apple heavily focuses on privacy and security. That includes protecting against remote exploits, local exploits from compromised apps and data extraction.
-
It's hardly only GrapheneOS focusing on protecting users against exploits. Apple and Google have put a ton of work into it. Apple heavily focuses on privacy and security. That includes protecting against remote exploits, local exploits from compromised apps and data extraction.
GrapheneOS and iOS are both heavily focused on privacy and security. Both are gradually adding much stronger protections against apps/sites scraping data, coercion users into giving data via alternatives with case-by-case consent and increasingly strong exploit protections.
-
GrapheneOS and iOS are both heavily focused on privacy and security. Both are gradually adding much stronger protections against apps/sites scraping data, coercion users into giving data via alternatives with case-by-case consent and increasingly strong exploit protections.
/e/ is far weaker in all of these areas compared to the standard Android Open Source Project on secure hardware. It doesn't keep up with standards updates and protections. It adds tons of low security attack surface and privacy invasive services. It's not in the same space as us.
-
For years, Gaël Duval has spearheaded a campaign to misrepresent GrapheneOS as not being usable, not compatible with apps and only useful to a tiny minority of people. He has repeatedly claimed GrapheneOS is for pedophiles, criminals and spies while claiming /e/ is for everyone.
as a non-expert my first conclusion is that someone like Duval is working for state agencies if he's working to diminish security for us mere mortals
-
/e/ is far weaker in all of these areas compared to the standard Android Open Source Project on secure hardware. It doesn't keep up with standards updates and protections. It adds tons of low security attack surface and privacy invasive services. It's not in the same space as us.
-
GrapheneOS and iOS are both heavily focused on privacy and security. Both are gradually adding much stronger protections against apps/sites scraping data, coercion users into giving data via alternatives with case-by-case consent and increasingly strong exploit protections.
@GrapheneOS to be fair they don't promise security, only privacy. at least in their foreword on their website here.
I don't think it's by accident that they don't even use the word secure, or security, on the whole page.
/e/OS - e Foundation - deGoogled unGoogled smartphone operating systems and online services - your data is your data
ECOSYSTEMKEY FEATURESGET /E/OSNEED HELP /e/OS is a complete, fully “deGoogled”, mobile ecosystem /e/OS is an open-source mobile operating system paired with carefully selected applications. They form a privacy-enabled internal system for your smartphone. And it’s not just claims: open-source means auditable privacy. /e/OS has received academic recognition from researchers at…
(e.foundation)
I've seen claims before where they claim it's better than GrapheneOS. But in what regard? Maybe degoogling and having alternatives pre-installed? GrapheneOS is probably more involved to get the same apps. That's the only way /e/ is better in my opinion
-
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything
@GrapheneOS *sigh* once again the pedo* argument. Right in line with right wing folks in the EU chat surveillance is necessary because you know ....
-
@GrapheneOS to be fair they don't promise security, only privacy. at least in their foreword on their website here.
I don't think it's by accident that they don't even use the word secure, or security, on the whole page.
/e/OS - e Foundation - deGoogled unGoogled smartphone operating systems and online services - your data is your data
ECOSYSTEMKEY FEATURESGET /E/OSNEED HELP /e/OS is a complete, fully “deGoogled”, mobile ecosystem /e/OS is an open-source mobile operating system paired with carefully selected applications. They form a privacy-enabled internal system for your smartphone. And it’s not just claims: open-source means auditable privacy. /e/OS has received academic recognition from researchers at…
(e.foundation)
I've seen claims before where they claim it's better than GrapheneOS. But in what regard? Maybe degoogling and having alternatives pre-installed? GrapheneOS is probably more involved to get the same apps. That's the only way /e/ is better in my opinion
@GrapheneOS but I'm fine with not even comparing them. grapheneos is an OS and /e/ is a ROM
-
/e/ is far weaker in all of these areas compared to the standard Android Open Source Project on secure hardware. It doesn't keep up with standards updates and protections. It adds tons of low security attack surface and privacy invasive services. It's not in the same space as us.
/e/ and Murena devices are far worse for privacy and security than an iPhone. It's trivial to break into their devices remotely or extract data from them compared to an iPhone. They have weaker privacy protections from apps too. Their main approach to privacy is a DNS blocklist.
-
/e/ and Murena devices are far worse for privacy and security than an iPhone. It's trivial to break into their devices remotely or extract data from them compared to an iPhone. They have weaker privacy protections from apps too. Their main approach to privacy is a DNS blocklist.
Their DNS blocklist can only block domains not used for useful functionality to avoid ruining usability. Meanwhile, the most privacy invasive behavior by apps is rarely ever split out into separate domains. Even for those, apps and websites can trivially evade DNS blocklists.
