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  3. Today I have spent way too much time handling the https://copy.fail situation #copyfail

Today I have spent way too much time handling the https://copy.fail situation #copyfail

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  • alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA alexanderkjall@mastodon.social

    Today I have spent way too much time handling the https://copy.fail situation #copyfail

    The persons who discovered it didn't notify the distribution security list, so no patched kernels was available for people to install when they released it.

    But they did have time to write an exploit, and thought it was a good idea to distribute that on day one, before vendors had time to provide patches.

    I'm not very impressed with xint.io, I guess it's the marketing department that runs the show.

    itsec_agentur@infosec.exchangeI This user is from outside of this forum
    itsec_agentur@infosec.exchangeI This user is from outside of this forum
    itsec_agentur@infosec.exchange
    wrote last edited by
    #2

    @alexanderkjall indeed

    1 Reply Last reply
    0
    • alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA alexanderkjall@mastodon.social

      Today I have spent way too much time handling the https://copy.fail situation #copyfail

      The persons who discovered it didn't notify the distribution security list, so no patched kernels was available for people to install when they released it.

      But they did have time to write an exploit, and thought it was a good idea to distribute that on day one, before vendors had time to provide patches.

      I'm not very impressed with xint.io, I guess it's the marketing department that runs the show.

      smlx@fosstodon.orgS This user is from outside of this forum
      smlx@fosstodon.orgS This user is from outside of this forum
      smlx@fosstodon.org
      wrote last edited by
      #3

      @alexanderkjall yeah they sure come across as an amateurish outfit with moves like this

      1 Reply Last reply
      0
      • alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA alexanderkjall@mastodon.social

        Today I have spent way too much time handling the https://copy.fail situation #copyfail

        The persons who discovered it didn't notify the distribution security list, so no patched kernels was available for people to install when they released it.

        But they did have time to write an exploit, and thought it was a good idea to distribute that on day one, before vendors had time to provide patches.

        I'm not very impressed with xint.io, I guess it's the marketing department that runs the show.

        aj@techhub.socialA This user is from outside of this forum
        aj@techhub.socialA This user is from outside of this forum
        aj@techhub.social
        wrote last edited by
        #4

        @alexanderkjall ditto on spending too much time, & agreed they should have notified distro maintainers 😑

        1 Reply Last reply
        0
        • alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA alexanderkjall@mastodon.social

          Today I have spent way too much time handling the https://copy.fail situation #copyfail

          The persons who discovered it didn't notify the distribution security list, so no patched kernels was available for people to install when they released it.

          But they did have time to write an exploit, and thought it was a good idea to distribute that on day one, before vendors had time to provide patches.

          I'm not very impressed with xint.io, I guess it's the marketing department that runs the show.

          labanskoller@infosec.exchangeL This user is from outside of this forum
          labanskoller@infosec.exchangeL This user is from outside of this forum
          labanskoller@infosec.exchange
          wrote last edited by
          #5

          @alexanderkjall I read that they had waited a month with distributing the PoC and that major distributions were prepared.

          J noisytoot@berkeley.edu.plN 2 Replies Last reply
          0
          • alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA alexanderkjall@mastodon.social

            Today I have spent way too much time handling the https://copy.fail situation #copyfail

            The persons who discovered it didn't notify the distribution security list, so no patched kernels was available for people to install when they released it.

            But they did have time to write an exploit, and thought it was a good idea to distribute that on day one, before vendors had time to provide patches.

            I'm not very impressed with xint.io, I guess it's the marketing department that runs the show.

            penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
            penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
            penguin42@mastodon.org.uk
            wrote last edited by
            #6

            @alexanderkjall But they say they 'Reported to Linux kernel security team' on 23rd March; shouldn't that have triggered the distros finding out?

            alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA drwho@masto.hackers.townD 2 Replies Last reply
            0
            • labanskoller@infosec.exchangeL labanskoller@infosec.exchange

              @alexanderkjall I read that they had waited a month with distributing the PoC and that major distributions were prepared.

              J This user is from outside of this forum
              J This user is from outside of this forum
              jmm@fosstodon.org
              wrote last edited by
              #7

              @LabanSkoller @alexanderkjall if they say so, they are lying. The distros security list wasn't notified and there was no headsup to Debian outside of the list either. And Ubuntu surely neither, otherwise they wouldn't have just pushed a patched kmod package with the module blacklisted...

              labanskoller@infosec.exchangeL adamw@fosstodon.orgA 2 Replies Last reply
              0
              • penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP penguin42@mastodon.org.uk

                @alexanderkjall But they say they 'Reported to Linux kernel security team' on 23rd March; shouldn't that have triggered the distros finding out?

                alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA This user is from outside of this forum
                alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA This user is from outside of this forum
                alexanderkjall@mastodon.social
                wrote last edited by
                #8

                @penguin42 It did not, the process is somewhat described here: https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html

                penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP 1 Reply Last reply
                0
                • alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA alexanderkjall@mastodon.social

                  Today I have spent way too much time handling the https://copy.fail situation #copyfail

                  The persons who discovered it didn't notify the distribution security list, so no patched kernels was available for people to install when they released it.

                  But they did have time to write an exploit, and thought it was a good idea to distribute that on day one, before vendors had time to provide patches.

                  I'm not very impressed with xint.io, I guess it's the marketing department that runs the show.

                  jonasgeiler@fosstodon.orgJ This user is from outside of this forum
                  jonasgeiler@fosstodon.orgJ This user is from outside of this forum
                  jonasgeiler@fosstodon.org
                  wrote last edited by
                  #9

                  @alexanderkjall

                  An "AI-assisted finding", using a pretty AI-written and designed looking website, m-dash, semicolons, it has it all 🤔
                  Couldn't their AI also tell them how to report it properly???

                  1 Reply Last reply
                  0
                  • alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA alexanderkjall@mastodon.social

                    Today I have spent way too much time handling the https://copy.fail situation #copyfail

                    The persons who discovered it didn't notify the distribution security list, so no patched kernels was available for people to install when they released it.

                    But they did have time to write an exploit, and thought it was a good idea to distribute that on day one, before vendors had time to provide patches.

                    I'm not very impressed with xint.io, I guess it's the marketing department that runs the show.

                    raven667@hachyderm.ioR This user is from outside of this forum
                    raven667@hachyderm.ioR This user is from outside of this forum
                    raven667@hachyderm.io
                    wrote last edited by
                    #10

                    @alexanderkjall Brad Spender (GRSecurity) has been highly critical of the Linux Kernel security bug handling process since forever, and one of those criticisms is that the members of security@kernel.org don't notify the linux-distros security list, or really triage severity in a way that he approves of as a security vendor and practitioner, their "security bugs are just bugs" stance that refuses to give priority to security issues is infuriating to some people who see security bugs as higher priority than any other kind of bug.

                    omegapolice@hachyderm.ioO arcaik@hachyderm.ioA 2 Replies Last reply
                    0
                    • J jmm@fosstodon.org

                      @LabanSkoller @alexanderkjall if they say so, they are lying. The distros security list wasn't notified and there was no headsup to Debian outside of the list either. And Ubuntu surely neither, otherwise they wouldn't have just pushed a patched kmod package with the module blacklisted...

                      labanskoller@infosec.exchangeL This user is from outside of this forum
                      labanskoller@infosec.exchangeL This user is from outside of this forum
                      labanskoller@infosec.exchange
                      wrote last edited by
                      #11

                      @jmm @alexanderkjall I think I mixed it up with the Linux kernel security team. But shouldn’t *that* team notify the distros?

                      alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA poslovitch@wikis.worldP 2 Replies Last reply
                      0
                      • labanskoller@infosec.exchangeL labanskoller@infosec.exchange

                        @jmm @alexanderkjall I think I mixed it up with the Linux kernel security team. But shouldn’t *that* team notify the distros?

                        alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA This user is from outside of this forum
                        alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA This user is from outside of this forum
                        alexanderkjall@mastodon.social
                        wrote last edited by
                        #12

                        @LabanSkoller @jmm They do not, the process is somewhat described here: https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html

                        labanskoller@infosec.exchangeL 1 Reply Last reply
                        0
                        • alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA alexanderkjall@mastodon.social

                          @penguin42 It did not, the process is somewhat described here: https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html

                          penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
                          penguin42@mastodon.org.ukP This user is from outside of this forum
                          penguin42@mastodon.org.uk
                          wrote last edited by
                          #13

                          @alexanderkjall That feels too complicated to leave to leave just to a (potentially 1st time) reporter. I would have hoped that at the very least the LK security team would track with the reporter and remind them of the need to do the other bits regularly. Especially on a nasty one!

                          pwaring@social.xk7.netP fedops@fosstodon.orgF 2 Replies Last reply
                          0
                          • J jmm@fosstodon.org

                            @LabanSkoller @alexanderkjall if they say so, they are lying. The distros security list wasn't notified and there was no headsup to Debian outside of the list either. And Ubuntu surely neither, otherwise they wouldn't have just pushed a patched kmod package with the module blacklisted...

                            adamw@fosstodon.orgA This user is from outside of this forum
                            adamw@fosstodon.orgA This user is from outside of this forum
                            adamw@fosstodon.org
                            wrote last edited by
                            #14

                            @jmm @LabanSkoller @alexanderkjall yeah, it's definitely not been handled optimally. on the RH side, Fedora happens to be OK as the fix landed upstream in 6.19.12 and that already went stable, but RHEL (and hence CentOS and probably Alma and Rocky) are affected with no day-0 update - https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-31431 .

                            1 Reply Last reply
                            0
                            • alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA alexanderkjall@mastodon.social

                              Today I have spent way too much time handling the https://copy.fail situation #copyfail

                              The persons who discovered it didn't notify the distribution security list, so no patched kernels was available for people to install when they released it.

                              But they did have time to write an exploit, and thought it was a good idea to distribute that on day one, before vendors had time to provide patches.

                              I'm not very impressed with xint.io, I guess it's the marketing department that runs the show.

                              omegapolice@hachyderm.ioO This user is from outside of this forum
                              omegapolice@hachyderm.ioO This user is from outside of this forum
                              omegapolice@hachyderm.io
                              wrote last edited by
                              #15

                              @alexanderkjall And there I sat, thinking it was just me being too dumb to figure out whether I had a patched kernel without running their bespoke, obfuscated script.

                              drwho@masto.hackers.townD 1 Reply Last reply
                              0
                              • raven667@hachyderm.ioR raven667@hachyderm.io

                                @alexanderkjall Brad Spender (GRSecurity) has been highly critical of the Linux Kernel security bug handling process since forever, and one of those criticisms is that the members of security@kernel.org don't notify the linux-distros security list, or really triage severity in a way that he approves of as a security vendor and practitioner, their "security bugs are just bugs" stance that refuses to give priority to security issues is infuriating to some people who see security bugs as higher priority than any other kind of bug.

                                omegapolice@hachyderm.ioO This user is from outside of this forum
                                omegapolice@hachyderm.ioO This user is from outside of this forum
                                omegapolice@hachyderm.io
                                wrote last edited by
                                #16

                                @raven667 @alexanderkjall Sounds like reasonable criticism to me. But then, an extended group of volunteers can only be expected to do so much. If we want SLAs, we have to pay people.

                                raven667@hachyderm.ioR 1 Reply Last reply
                                0
                                • alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA alexanderkjall@mastodon.social

                                  @LabanSkoller @jmm They do not, the process is somewhat described here: https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html

                                  labanskoller@infosec.exchangeL This user is from outside of this forum
                                  labanskoller@infosec.exchangeL This user is from outside of this forum
                                  labanskoller@infosec.exchange
                                  wrote last edited by
                                  #17

                                  @alexanderkjall @jmm hmm…
                                  > As such, the kernel security team strongly recommends that as a reporter of a potential security issue you DO NOT contact the “linux-distros” mailing list UNTIL a fix is accepted by the affected code’s maintainers and you have read the distros wiki page above and you fully understand the requirements that contacting “linux-distros” will impose on you and the kernel community.

                                  Well, if it’s too complicated to be a reporter, there is always fulldisclosure@seclists.org. 😉

                                  drwho@masto.hackers.townD 1 Reply Last reply
                                  0
                                  • omegapolice@hachyderm.ioO omegapolice@hachyderm.io

                                    @raven667 @alexanderkjall Sounds like reasonable criticism to me. But then, an extended group of volunteers can only be expected to do so much. If we want SLAs, we have to pay people.

                                    raven667@hachyderm.ioR This user is from outside of this forum
                                    raven667@hachyderm.ioR This user is from outside of this forum
                                    raven667@hachyderm.io
                                    wrote last edited by
                                    #18

                                    @OmegaPolice @alexanderkjall yes and the majority of Linux kernel development is not volunteers, its a consortium of vendors organized through the Linux Foundation trade org which _does_ pay people. There are still volunteers who work on Linux but they shouldn't be a shield for the majority to pretend they are "just a smol bean, uwu" and dont have some responsibilities.

                                    I'm the *first* to say that dragging volunteer FOSS maintainers is shitty (and that volunteers shouldn't cosplay as commercial vendors, by doing things like having public issue trackers, as it is nonsense to "open a support case" with a tracking number against a *volunteer*) but Linux kernel has volunteers it is not a volunteer led project anymore, its a consortium of major companies which benefit from pooling effort and having a neutral forum to collaborate.

                                    I think security focused people, whose customers are also prioritizing security sometimes dont have empathy for or understand people who don't have security as their top priority, and treat people who don't share their priorities as stupid and incompetent, rather than understanding the differences in goals and constraints. That said there is probably room for improvement on kernel security, but more from a better systematic approach to prevent defects than treating every bug with a website as some super secret special thing. the current design makes a constant stream of local exploits inevitable

                                    alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA 1 Reply Last reply
                                    0
                                    • raven667@hachyderm.ioR raven667@hachyderm.io

                                      @OmegaPolice @alexanderkjall yes and the majority of Linux kernel development is not volunteers, its a consortium of vendors organized through the Linux Foundation trade org which _does_ pay people. There are still volunteers who work on Linux but they shouldn't be a shield for the majority to pretend they are "just a smol bean, uwu" and dont have some responsibilities.

                                      I'm the *first* to say that dragging volunteer FOSS maintainers is shitty (and that volunteers shouldn't cosplay as commercial vendors, by doing things like having public issue trackers, as it is nonsense to "open a support case" with a tracking number against a *volunteer*) but Linux kernel has volunteers it is not a volunteer led project anymore, its a consortium of major companies which benefit from pooling effort and having a neutral forum to collaborate.

                                      I think security focused people, whose customers are also prioritizing security sometimes dont have empathy for or understand people who don't have security as their top priority, and treat people who don't share their priorities as stupid and incompetent, rather than understanding the differences in goals and constraints. That said there is probably room for improvement on kernel security, but more from a better systematic approach to prevent defects than treating every bug with a website as some super secret special thing. the current design makes a constant stream of local exploits inevitable

                                      alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA This user is from outside of this forum
                                      alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA This user is from outside of this forum
                                      alexanderkjall@mastodon.social
                                      wrote last edited by
                                      #19

                                      @raven667 @OmegaPolice I agree that it would be great if the kernel security team had a process that made life simpler for downstream vendors.

                                      But since neither me or my employer contributes anything to make that happen I don't think it's my place to have public opinions about it.

                                      Personally I would love to see more effort focused on reducing the attack surface of the kernel.

                                      1 Reply Last reply
                                      0
                                      • labanskoller@infosec.exchangeL labanskoller@infosec.exchange

                                        @jmm @alexanderkjall I think I mixed it up with the Linux kernel security team. But shouldn’t *that* team notify the distros?

                                        poslovitch@wikis.worldP This user is from outside of this forum
                                        poslovitch@wikis.worldP This user is from outside of this forum
                                        poslovitch@wikis.world
                                        wrote last edited by
                                        #20

                                        @LabanSkoller @jmm @alexanderkjall No non I actually read that too from the FAQ on the Copyfail page yesterday. So. That was a lie?

                                        1 Reply Last reply
                                        0
                                        • alexanderkjall@mastodon.socialA alexanderkjall@mastodon.social

                                          Today I have spent way too much time handling the https://copy.fail situation #copyfail

                                          The persons who discovered it didn't notify the distribution security list, so no patched kernels was available for people to install when they released it.

                                          But they did have time to write an exploit, and thought it was a good idea to distribute that on day one, before vendors had time to provide patches.

                                          I'm not very impressed with xint.io, I guess it's the marketing department that runs the show.

                                          regishaubourg@mastodon.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
                                          regishaubourg@mastodon.socialR This user is from outside of this forum
                                          regishaubourg@mastodon.social
                                          wrote last edited by
                                          #21

                                          @alexanderkjall and strangely disclosed just before the 1st of may, like the mongobleed disclosed just before 1st of January.
                                          Almost as a buzz strategy, pushing IT folks to work on weekends and public holidays.
                                          Seriously, waiting next Monday, letting a weekend to all distros was so hard?

                                          1 Reply Last reply
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