<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Bitwarden confirmed @bitwarden&#x2F;cli@2026.4.0 shipped a malicious payload for 93 minutes April 22.]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Bitwarden confirmed @bitwarden/cli@2026.4.0 shipped a malicious payload for 93 minutes April 22. Vector: Checkmarx's ast-github-action inside Bitwarden's build pipeline. The build carried "Shai-Hulud: The Third Coming" and stole GitHub tokens, npm tokens, SSH keys, .env files, cloud credentials. Anyone running npm install in that window had every credential compromised. Supply-chain attacks shop upstream of you, not at you.</p><p><a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/CyberSecurity" rel="tag">#<span>CyberSecurity</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/InfoSec" rel="tag">#<span>InfoSec</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/DevOps" rel="tag">#<span>DevOps</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/SupplyChain" rel="tag">#<span>SupplyChain</span></a></p>]]></description><link>https://board.circlewithadot.net/topic/fa901f97-ed7f-4a29-959e-1b003dd19213/bitwarden-confirmed-@bitwarden-cli@2026.4.0-shipped-a-malicious-payload-for-93-minutes-april-22.</link><generator>RSS for Node</generator><lastBuildDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 23:32:41 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://board.circlewithadot.net/topic/fa901f97-ed7f-4a29-959e-1b003dd19213.rss" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 16:00:06 GMT</pubDate><ttl>60</ttl><item><title><![CDATA[Reply to Bitwarden confirmed @bitwarden&#x2F;cli@2026.4.0 shipped a malicious payload for 93 minutes April 22. on Sun, 26 Apr 2026 20:45:29 GMT]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><span><a href="/user/canartuc%40mastodon.social">@<span>canartuc</span></a></span> Is this client or server update?</p>]]></description><link>https://board.circlewithadot.net/post/https://infosec.exchange/users/eingfoan/statuses/116472960098506968</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://board.circlewithadot.net/post/https://infosec.exchange/users/eingfoan/statuses/116472960098506968</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[eingfoan@infosec.exchange]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 20:45:29 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Reply to Bitwarden confirmed @bitwarden&#x2F;cli@2026.4.0 shipped a malicious payload for 93 minutes April 22. on Sun, 26 Apr 2026 18:01:32 GMT]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>This is why pinned actions with SHA hashes matter.</p><p>If your CI uses action@v2 instead of action@sha, a compromised tag runs untrusted code in your build. The Bitwarden incident is the textbook case.</p><p>Fix: replace every tag reference with a commit SHA. Add a CI check that rejects unpinned actions.</p><p>I scanned 15 workflows in a YC W23 repo and found 60+ unpinned references. The tooling exists. Most teams just have not run it.</p><p><a href="https://mstdn.social/tags/DevOps" rel="tag">#<span>DevOps</span></a> <a href="https://mstdn.social/tags/SupplyChainSecurity" rel="tag">#<span>SupplyChainSecurity</span></a></p>]]></description><link>https://board.circlewithadot.net/post/https://mstdn.social/ap/users/116466210808778718/statuses/116472315424068468</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://board.circlewithadot.net/post/https://mstdn.social/ap/users/116466210808778718/statuses/116472315424068468</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[alexreed@mstdn.social]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 18:01:32 GMT</pubDate></item></channel></rss>